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COMMENT
2001:  A SPACE LEGISLATION ODYSSEY—A




“[TO] COMBINE THE BEST OF ARTHUR C. CLARKE WITH ADAM SMITH.” 1
                                                       
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate May 1999, American University, Washington College of Law/Kogod
Graduate School of Business; B.A., 1996, University of Washington School of Business.  The author
would like to thank his mother, father, and sister for their unconditional love and support.  At
the time this Comment went to print, the 105th Congress concluded without acting on the Bills
discussed herein.  Nonetheless, a new Bill, S. 376, entitled “Open Market Reorganization for
Better International Telecommunications” (“ORBIT”), was re-introduced by Sen. Conrad Burns
in the 106th Congress and contains basically the same provisions as the Bills discussed herein.
See Burns Floats Draft Bill on Intelsat Privatization, TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L, Jan. 29, 1999, at 1
(discussing the introduction of the proposed Satellite Services Competition and Privatization
Act of 1999); see also ‘ORBIT’ Bills Falls Short of Compromise on Intelsat, TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L,
Feb. 12, 1999, at 1 (discussing the introduction of ORBIT in the 106th Congress).
1. See The Communications Satellite Competition and Privatization Act of 1997:  Legislative
Hearing on H.R. 1872 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House
Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. 61, at 22 (1997) [hereinafter Satellite Comp. Hearings] (testimony
of Jack Gleason, Associate Administrator for International Affairs, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration) (describing the delicate goal of striking
a balance between technological innovation and economic efficiency); see also GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  COMPETITION ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS ((GAO/RCED-97-1) Oct. 11, 1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT
‘97] (“The world famous physicist and science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke is credited with
conceptualizing, in 1945, plans that showed how three objects orbiting the earth at different
locations 22,300 miles above the equator could distribute radio signals that could reach
anywhere on earth.”); Robert A. Nelson, The Art of Communication via Satellite, VIA SATELLITE,
July 1998, at 16 (“In 1945 Arthur C. Clarke wrote an article entitled ‘The Future of World
Communications’ for the magazine Wireless World.  This article, which the editors renamed
‘Extra-Terrestrial Relays,’ was published in the October issue.  In it, Clarke described the
properties of the geostationary orbit, a circular orbit in the equatorial plane of the earth such
that a satellite appears to hover over a fixed point on the equator.”); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
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Few Americans know that satellite service is only possible through
the auspices of an internationally sanctioned monopoly.  During the
105th Congress, important legislation was introducted which could
have changed this.  Congressmen Thomas Bliley2 and Edward
Markey3 introduced H.R. 1872 (the “Bliley Bill”), entitled the
                                                       
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (discussing free market and
laissez-faire economics).
2. Representative Thomas Bliley represents Virginia’s Seventh District and is the
Chairman of the House Commerce Committee.  See JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1997-1998 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 105TH CONGRESS 415
(1998) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY].
3. Representative Edward Markey is a Democrat from Massachusetts and is also a member
of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection.  See id.
“Communications Satellite Competition and Privatization Act of
1998” (the “Act”), which could have dramatically affected the
provision of international satellite telecommunications services
around the world.  The Bliley Bill sought to amend the
Communications Satellite Act of 19624 by calling for the privatization
of all treaty-established Intergovernmental Satellite Organizations
(“ISOs”) beginning in the Year 2001.5  At the cornerstone of the
debate was the future role of the three ISOs:  COMSAT, INTELSAT,
and Inmarsat.
For the past three decades, these ISOs have provided global
nondiscriminatory service, including everything from a direct
communications link, the “Hot Line,” between the President and
Moscow during the Cold War to worldwide coverage of the Summer
Olympics.  However, as worldwide privatization of state-owned
telecommunications companies continues,6 the value of a
monopolistic global satellite system has diminished.  On the horizon,
numerous private satellite companies stand ready to compete in this
marketplace.7  These companies argue that they can provide the same
non-discriminatory service to consumers around the world at lower
prices.8
Not surprisingly, these calls for privatization have not been left
unanswered.  While Washington agrees that the old system hinders
                                                       
at 415.
4. See infra Part I.A (discussing the legislative history behind the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962).
5. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. (1998).
6. See John H. Harwood II et al., Competition in International Telecommunications Services, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 874, 904 n.37 (1997).  The European Union adopted a directive, Commission
Directive 96/19, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 14, to begin privatizing many of Europe’s dominant carriers.
See id., at 904.  In Japan, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone was allowed to compete with the
former international service monopoly, Kokusai Denshin Denwa for the first time.  See id.
Moreover, Singapore intends to end Singapore Telecom’s monopoly by mid-2000 and Australia
was scheduled to be deregulated last year.  See id.  In the Americas, Canada, Chile, and several
Latin American countries have privatized their telecommunications operators.  See id.
7. See Chris Forrester, LEO, GEOs and MEOs, Will They All Fly?, VIA SATELLITE, Oct. 1997, at
18 (discussing the various satellite systems proposing to offer their satellite communications
services beginning in 1998); see also Timothy J. Logue, Opening Doors Around the World, SATELLITE
TELECOMMS., Aug. 1996, at 31.  The satellite industry is in its most dynamic growth stage ever.
See id.  In developed countries, Global Positioning System technology coupled with direct
broadcast satellite services are reaching more people than ever.  See id.  In developing countries,
the demand for satellites is growing at an exponential rate because of the lack of terrestrial
infrastructure costs.  See id.  The next generation of satellites, low and medium earth orbiting,
will bring internet access to businesses and consumers alike.  See id.
8. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 43 (testimony of Gerald B. Helman, Vice
President, Mobile Communications Holding, Inc.).  “Technology is making possible a broad
array of services by satellite, capable of reaching and benefiting everyone.”  Id.  U.S. based
companies are prepared to offer nondiscriminatory service to the entire world.  See id.  “The
bottom line of a competitive marketplace is that more people around the world will be served
by a growing array of [services] at lower prices.”  Id.
competition, ongoing debate still exists as to the future role of the
ISOs.9  This, however, did not prevent the proposed legislation from
garnering significant bi-partisan support from both the House of
Representatives and the Senate in its initial stages.10  The Bliley Bill
passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives and was
forwarded to the Senate for review.11  Meanwhile, Senator Conrad
Burns12 recently introduced in the Senate the “International Satellite
Communications Reform Act of 1998,”13 with similar aims to privatize
the ISOs.  The Clinton Administration has also joined the
restructuring efforts by establishing a working group to facilitate the
restructuring of the ISOs.14  Consequently, change is inevitable; the
question now is whether the Act provides the best vehicle for that
change.
This Comment reviews the U.S. Government’s efforts to create a
competitive satellite industry in the United States through the
restructuring of the ISOs.  Part I provides a historical and legal
background of the ISOs in question.  Part II explains why these ISOs
frustrate competition in the modern-day telecommunications market.
Part III reviews the current efforts toward competition and
restructuring of the ISOs.  Part IV looks specifically at the Act and
describes the obstacles to be overcome to achieve success.  Finally,
Part V proposes a working model for legislation to ensure that the
Act’s goals of global competition are met.
I. A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL OVERVIEW OF ISOS
A. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962
Some Americans can still recall the 1950s when the Russian launch
of Sputnik threatened America’s proclaimed “technological
superiority.”15  The success of Sputnik at the peak of the Cold War
                                                       
9. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the ongoing debate over the ISO restructuring).
10. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, -.D, -.G, and .E (discussing the various pieces of
legislation introduced in Congress aimed at restructuring the ISOs).
11. See 144 CONG. REC. H2859 (daily ed. May 6, 1998) (recording passage of H.R. 1872 by a
403 to 16 vote); see also Mike Mills, New Competition for COMSAT?, WASH. POST, May 7, 1998, at
E5 (discussing the passing of H.R. 1872 and possible consequences if enacted).
12. Senator Conrad Burns is a Republican from Montana and Chairman of the Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Communications.  See
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 2, at 377.
13. S. 2365, 105th Cong. (1998) (stating that its goals are to promote competition in a
global satellite market by privatizing intergovernmental satellite organizations).
14. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2, -.3 (discussing the current efforts by the
Administration to facilitate ISO restructuring).
     15.  See ANN HENRY, THE SATELLITE SERVICES INDUSTRY 3-4 (Oct. 8, 1997) (Robertson Stephens
Telecoms Research Report) (discussing the launch of Sputnik as igniting a global ‘space race’).
sparked a legacy of insecurity with the American People about space
technology.16  Many Americans believed that the “race to space”
would determine the outcome of the Cold War.17  Based on this
public insecurity, Congress responded with a flurry of space
legislation directed at easing the national conscience.18
One such initiative was the enactment of the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 (“CS Act”),19 which sought to establish a global
communications system operated by a United States company.  Some
pundits suggested that a U.S.-driven proposal for global satellite
services was the only way to keep the Russian space program at bay
until the United States caught up.20  Others believed that an
international cooperative was the only viable economic model for the
provision of global satellite services.21  Either way, the CS Act
represented the first international attempt at commercial space
activity.
The CS Act’s primary goal was to develop a commercial
communications satellite system for worldwide telephone
connectivity.22  The CS Act mandated the application of military
defense space technology in developing the global system.23  Under
extensive governmental oversight,24 the CS Act created the
                                                       
16. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (opening statement by the Honorable W.J.
“Billy” Tauzin, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection) (“Americans believed that capitalism was the engine behind unending economic
growth.  Sputnik spooked us.”).
17. See PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR FORUM, THE DAWN OF THE SPACE AGE (visited Nov. 24,
1998) <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/forum/october97/sputnik_10-13.html> (on file with
the American University Law Review) (“The fact that a nuclear bomb could have been substituted
for the satellite was quickly pointed out.”).
18. See HENRY, supra note 15, at 6.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1997) (reporting under § 701(a) that the policy of Congress under
this Act was to establish a commercial communications satellite system, in conjunction with
other countries, to incorporate “public needs and national objectives, which will serve the
communication needs of the United States and other countries, which will contribute to world
peace and understanding”).
20. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (opening statement by the Honorable W.J.
“Billy” Tauzin, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection); see also G.A. CODDING, JR., THE FUTURE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 38 (1990).
Responding to the challenge created by U.S. support of INTELSAT, the Soviet Union created
Intersputnik in 1968.  See id.  Today Intersputnik offers telecommunications services to users in
seventy different countries, including the United States.  See id.
21. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
22. SEE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  COMPETITIVE IMPACT OF
RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE ORGANIZATIONS 1 ((GAO/RCED-96-204) July 8,
1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ‘96].
23. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 14 (reporting that the military launched its first
satellite, Explorer I, on January 31, 1958); see also Robert Wold, Nasa at 40, The Early Years Pay
Off, VIA SATELLITE, Oct. 1998, at 32 (stating that the roots for communications satellites are in
rocket science developed for intercontinental ballistic missiles).
24. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 18 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
Communications Satellite Corporation (“COMSAT”)25 to develop and
coordinate the system.  At the time it was passed, no one could have
guessed the tremendous impact and success the CS Act would
eventually have on world communication.
When Apollo 11 landed on the moon in 1969,26 the images of the
event were carried live via satellite to millions of people worldwide.27
As a result of a global commercial satellite system, it was the most
widely viewed event in broadcast history.28  As astronaut Neil
Armstrong announced that he had taken “one small step for man,
one giant leap for mankind,” Americans at last were able to shed
their insecurity over Sputnik.  Congress’ repeated attempts to ease
the national conscience had finally manifested itself through the
legacy of the CS Act.
From that point forward, America would regain the lead in the
space race.  More importantly, however, these satellite images marked
the beginning of a period that would change forever conventional
views of the universe and the world’s relationship to the cosmos.
B. COMSAT’s Catalyst Role in the Satellite Telecommunications Industry
Congress established COMSAT as a publicly traded private
corporation in 1962.29  Initially, the CS Act mandated that COMSAT
develop, alone or in conjunction with foreign governments, a
commercial communications satellite system.30  Many believed that
the best way to achieve this goal was to structure COMSAT as a
commercial for-profit entity which would then invest in the system.31
After numerous hearings on the matter, Congress eventually called
for COMSAT to work with countries around the world to create the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(“INTELSAT”).32  Today COMSAT remains the largest owner and
                                                       
International Bureau, FCC); see also 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(4) (1997) (stating that COMSAT is
subject to extensive supervision “to assure that COMSAT’s relations with foreign governments
and international organizations are consistent with the national interests and foreign policy of
the United States”).
25. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 3.  On June 1, 1993, the Communications
Satellite Corporation changed its name to COMSAT Corporation.  See id. at 20 n.1.
26. See EDGAR M. CARTRIGHT, APOLLO EXPEDITIONS TO THE MOON 203 (giving a detailed
discussion on the events leading up to, and during, the Apollo 11 landing).
27. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining that the satellite broadcast was
viewed by 500 million people).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 20.
30. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 18 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
31. See id.
32. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that INTELSAT was created first
through an interim agreement in 1964, with its present structure finalized in 1973 through an
user of the INTELSAT system in the United States.33  In 1979,
Congress expanded COMSAT’s role, making it a signatory to the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (“Inmarsat”) as well.34
As a result of its ‘legal monopoly,’ COMSAT became the sole United
States access provider to the Inmarsat and INTELSAT systems.
The benefits of COMSAT’s status as the only U.S. access provider
to the global systems are significant.  Today COMSAT is traded on
three U.S. exchanges by 48,000,000 shareholders.35  Its 1996 revenues
topped the 500 million dollar mark and its net income was just under
nine million.36  As a legal monopoly, COMSAT is regulated as a
dominant carrier by the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”).37  Accordingly, COMSAT must seek approval from the FCC
each year to raise equity or incur debt.38  In addition, these same
regulations prohibit any investor from owning more than ten percent
of its shares.39  As a result of these restrictions, however, COMSAT
also enjoys special privileges not afforded other satellite providers—
most notably, its immunity against U.S. antitrust laws.40
C. INTELSAT and Inmarsat
INTELSAT was established via international treaty by the United
States and eighteen other countries in 196441 to provide voice, data,
and video communications.  Although established by international
                                                       
intergovernmental agreement with other countries).
33. See id. at 23.  “Three U.S. agencies—the State and Commerce departments and the
Federal Communications Commission—have primary responsibility for overseeing U.S.
membership in the [ISOs] and for instructing the U.S. signatory in its representational role.”
Id. at 3.
34. See id. at 23.
35. See COMSAT CORP., SEC 10-K FILING (Mar. 24, 1997), available in LEXIS, COMPNY
Library, SEC File.
36. See COMSAT CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1997).
37. See International Satellite Reform:  Is Technology Outpacing Regulation?:  Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Comm. of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Comm., 105th Cong. (1998)
available at <http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/hearings/hearin98.htm> [hereinafter Satellite
Reform Hearings] (testimony of Betty Alewine, President and CEO, COMSAT Corporation).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See discussion infra Part II (describing recent litigation where COMSAT was deemed to
be immune from U.S. antitrust laws).
41. See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization “INTELSAT”, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3819, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective
Feb. 12, 1973) [hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement]; see also Johannes P. Pfeifenberger &
Hendrik S. Houthakker, Does INTELSAT Face Effective Competition in the Provision of its Services?
(July 1996) <http://www.citi.columbia.edu/history/conferen.htm> (presented during the
INTELSAT Restructure and Satellite Competition Conference at the Columbia Institute for
Tele-Information, New York, April 26, 1996) (concluding that INTELSAT faces effective
competition from alternative providers of telecommunications transmission capacity)
(Competition Report).  Although established in 1964, INTELSAT was converted into its present
day structure as an international treaty organization in 1973.  See id.
treaty, INTELSAT is a commercial venture intended to produce a
minimum fourteen percent return each year for its shareholders.42  In
order to facilitate the commercial framework, agreements were
drafted, allowing participation in ownership of the satellite capability.
Thus, countries could invest in the amount of delivery they desired by
purchasing an interest in INTELSAT.  Today INTELSAT has over 140
signatories possessing ownership in the INTELSAT system.  The
United States owns the largest share, at 17.96%.43  A minimum level
of participation is available to smaller countries like Uruguay, which
owns .05% of the system.44  Accordingly, no one country can control
delivery because maximum shares are based on total participation by
all countries.  As a result, each country shares a varying ownership
interest in INTELSAT, depending upon its use of INTELSAT services.
Today, INTELSAT provides global connectivity to over 200
countries and operates a global system of twenty-seven geostationary
satellites.45  Its 1997 revenues were approximately $900 million, and
its assets were worth over three billion dollars.46  Through the
INTELSAT system, millions of Americans and people worldwide have
been able to witness spectacular events, including live global coverage
of news-breaking events.
As a system owned by countries around the world, INTELSAT is
immune to the laws of any one country.47  Accordingly, INTELSAT is
immune from national taxes and cannot be sued unless it expressly
waives its immunity.48  In addition, INTELSAT enjoys special
privileges to lucrative geostationary satellite orbital slots which are
not afforded other operators.49  Finally, INTELSAT is the dominant
world provider of satellite services because it has special access to its
shareholders’ markets around the world.50
Like INTELSAT, the International Maritime Satellite Organization
                                                       
42. See GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE:  PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY 202-04 (1989); see also Michael A. Einhorn, INTELSAT, A Reform Proposal (July 15, 1996),
available at <http://www.citi.columbia.edu/history/einhorn.htm> (presented during the
INTELSAT Restructure and Satellite Competition Conference at Columbia Institute for Tele-
Information, New York, April 26, 1996) (reporting that today INTELSAT’s target rate of return
is 20%, while its actual rate of return is 17%).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See INTELSAT, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1997).
46. See id.
47. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 41, at art. XV (stating that INTELSAT is
governed by international treaty).
48. See id.
49. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the competitive advantages enjoyed by
INTELSAT).
50. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing INTELSAT’s dominance in its members’
markets).
(“Inmarsat”)51 was formed by an international treaty in 197952
pursuant to the Maritime Satellite Act.53  Its initial purpose was to
improve maritime communications.54  Through its operations,
Inmarsat has acted as a life-line to many seafarers by carrying distress
communications from ailing vessels at sea.55  Although Inmarsat was
established to provide global maritime communications, its services
were expanded in 1985 to include the aeronautical sector as well.56
More recent amendments in 1989 allow Inmarsat to compete in the
mobile satellite service markets.57  Today, Inmarsat operates a global
system of eight satellites—four operational and four spares.58  Like its
sister INTELSAT, Inmarsat enjoys immunity from all national laws
and taxation.59  Currently, Inmarsat is headquartered in London and
has seventy-nine member countries.60
D. The Legal Structure of the ISOs
As treaty organizations, INTELSAT and Inmarsat are made up of
‘parties’ and ‘signatories.’61  Parties are the national governments
which have signed the international treaty.  They meet biannually at
the Assembly of Parties to consider issues of general policy and long-
term objectives.62  Signatories, on the other hand, are the actual
owners and operators of the satellite systems.63  They are typically
owned by national governments or government sanctioned
monopolistic private companies.64  Some countries act as both
                                                       
51. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that the International Maritime
Satellite Organization was renamed the International Mobile Satellite Organization in 1993).
52. See Convention of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (“Inmarsat”), Sept.
3, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, 4, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105, 107 (effective July 16, 1979) [hereinafter Inmarsat
Convention].
53. Pub. L. No. 87-624, Title V, § 501, 92 Stat. 2392 (1978).
54. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 15 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
55. See id.
56. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 3.
57. See Inmarsat Convention, supra note 52, at art. III(1) (referencing “aeronautical
communications” and “air traffic services”).  See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  COMPETITION IN THE MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
(GAO/RCED-96-20) (Oct. 12, 1995) (describing the competition and market potential of the
mobile communications industry).
58. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 3.
59. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 41, at art. XV.
60. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 23-24.
61. See Einhorn, supra note 42.
62. See id. (reporting that the Assembly of Parties meet to decide “competitive rulemaking,
tariff-setting, capacity additions, technology overhauls, and the ways to maintain global
connectivity”).
63. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 15 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
64. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 3.
signatories and parties to the international treaty.
The signatories are responsible for financing INTELSAT and
Inmarsat.65  Their level of contribution depends on the level of
capacity the signatory desires from the system.66  The largest investors
of the system sit on the Board of Governors and participate in major
decisions affecting the organization.67  These decisions include the
design, development, establishment, operation, and maintenance of
the satellite system.68  Although each country gets one vote at the
Assembly of Parties, voting on the Board of Governors is dependent
upon each signatory’s investment share.69  COMSAT is the U.S.
signatory to both INTELSAT and Inmarsat, and also sits on the Board
of Governors.70
Countries will generally appoint only one agent as their signatory
to buy and resell capacity on the INTELSAT and Inmarsat systems.71
INTELSAT’s profits are distributed to the signatories on the basis of
their investment share in the system.72  Because the signatories pay for
all operational expenses of the ISOs, they recover this cost by selling
their invested capacity to local long-distance companies, private
network operators, broadcasters, and other organizations.73  In effect,
these signatories act as the marketing and selling arms of the ISOs.
The mark-ups charged by the signatories depend upon the country in
which they are providing service.74  In most cases, the signatory is able
to charge high rates because it is usually the sole direct access
provider to the INTELSAT and Inmarsat systems.75
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ISOS IMPEDES COMPETITION
A. Market Advantages
To provide satellite service in any country, the operator must gain
                                                       
65. See id. at 3.
66. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 15 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
67. See id.
68. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 22.
69. See id.
70. See Anthony Velocci, Jr., Lockheed-Martin Angling for Comsat Acquisition, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 28, 1998, available at 1998 WL 19818215 (reporting that COMSAT
owns 18% of INTELSAT and 22% of Inmarsat).
71. See Einhorn, supra note 42 (explaining that pending formal ratification, INTELSAT’s
Board of Governors will permit several signatories).
72. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 22.
73. See Pfeifenberger & Houthakker, supra note 41 (describing extensively the different
customers of international satellite services—including CBS, HBO, Reuters, and the BBC).
74. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 7.
75. See discussion infra Part II (describing how the structure of the ISOs impedes
competition).
permission from domestic licensing authorities.76  In the United
States, operators must submit requests to the FCC.77  In many other
countries, however, the licensing authorities are also signatories to
the ISOs.78  Signatories benefit significantly from this arrangement
because they have a vested interest in their investment in the ISOs
and charge large mark-ups on ISO services.79  Subsequently, these
licensing authorities favor INTELSAT and Inmarsat over other
foreign operators who desire to do business in their country.80
Some governments restrict access to foreign competitors altogether
and utilize the ISOs as their sole service providers.81  Others place
heavy restrictions upon operations, effectively closing markets to
other competitors.82  These barriers include:  (1) authorizing earth
stations only if they serve INTELSAT’s satellites; (2) assessing
prohibitively high tariffs on smaller earth stations used by private
satellite operators; (3) prohibiting alternative systems’
interconnectivity with the local telephone network (which, of course,
is also owned by the signatory/regulatory agency); and (4) denying
or restricting access to necessary radio spectrum for the transmission
of satellite signals.83  In the United States, however, end users and
long distance carriers are allowed to bypass COMSAT and purchase
capacity from other satellite providers.84  Nonetheless, the ISOs
possess strong market power over potential competitors in a
significant portion of the rest of the world.
B. Competitive Advantages
The ISOs also enjoy special advantages over the competition.  The
ISOs now control the most lucrative geostationary orbital slots that
                                                       
76. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 17 (stating that operators must gain the right to
use the necessary spectrum, such as radio frequencies, to establish the necessary ground stations
to receive satellite signals, and permission to interconnect on the ground with the domestic
telephone service).
77. See id.  INTELSAT, headquartered in the United States, also coordinates access to fixed
orbital locations and spectrum through the FCC.  See id.  However, submissions by INTELSAT to
the FCC are forwarded automatically to the International Telecommunications Union for
evaluation rather than being submitted to the FCC for approval.  See id.
78. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 30 (explaining that the FCC has reported that
71% of the signatories to the ISOs are also the regulatory authorities which decide on licensing,
spectrum allocation, and market access).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Einhorn, supra note 42.
82. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 29 (outlining concerns about competition in the
international communications market).
83. See id. at 30.
84. See Einhorn, supra note 42 (explaining that competition is more apparent in the
United States, where other telecommunications companies are allowed to purchase capacity in
other satellite systems besides INTELSAT).
link the major traffic routes around the world.85  As ISOs, INTELSAT
and Inmarsat enjoy faster access to these orbital slots because their
applications are not subject to national review.86  Other private
operators must first file with the appropriate national authority for
evaluation before their application is forwarded to the International
Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) for coordination.87  Although
the ISOs also submit their requests to their host country, these
submissions are mere formalities.88  The applications take only one to
two days to process because they are forwarded automatically to the
ITU without national review.89  The licensing process for private U.S.
operators, however, includes on average, a five-year FCC review for
the provision of international service and eighteen months for
domestic service.90
Furthermore, since orbital slots are awarded on a “first come, first
served” basis, this practice complicates new competitors’ access to the
slots.91  Latter applicants must coordinate with prior applicants in
order to hedge against technical interference.92  This is very
important for private operators because they must divulge sensitive
and proprietary business information to the ISOs when coordinating
with their systems.93  Not surprisingly, INTELSAT commonly registers
more slots than it needs because of this streamlined registration
                                                       
85. See Siegfreid Wiessner, The Public Order of the Geostationary Orbit:  Blueprints for the Future,
9 YALE J. WORLD. PUB. ORD. 217, 218-20 (1983) (reporting that the geostationary orbit lies
directly above the equator at an altitude of 22,300 (35,776 km) in the sky); see also Sharon L.
Fjordbak, The International Direct Broadcast Satellite Controversy, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 903, 905
(1990) (explaining why traditional communications satellites broadcast from a geostationary
orbit).  A satellite positioned in geostationary orbit provides the most desirable means of
relaying telecommunications signals because the satellite travels at the same speed of the
rotation of the earth.  See id.  Thus, its fixed position in the sky eliminates the need for a land-
based transmitter to track constantly its location.  See id.  Three satellites operating in relay can
provide worldwide coverage.  See id.  See generally Martin A. Rothblatt, The Impact of International
Satellite Communications Law upon Access to the Geostationary Orbit and the Electromagnetic Spectrum,
16 TEX. INT’L L.J. 207, 209-10 (1980) (discussing the development of geostationary spectrum).
86. See discussion supra Part I.C (stating that ISOs may bypass national regulatory
authorities in gaining rights to geostationary orbital slots).
87. See discussion supra Part II.A (illustrating as a market advantage the ISOs enjoy through
speedy licensing).
88. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing various governmental controls over
telecommunications).  INTELSAT submits its requests to the United States while Inmarsat
submits its requests to the United Kingdom.  See id.
89. See id. (noting the short timeframe for processing government submissions).
90. See id. (pointing out the significant amount of time taken by the FCC to process private
company licenses).
91. See Henry Wong, Comment, The Paper “Satellite” Chase:  The ITU Prepares for its Final
Exam in Resolution 18, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 850-51 (1998) (discussing the ITU’s orbital slot
registration process).
92. See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the ISOs’ orbital slot registration
process).
93. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting that various companies have
complained of being competitively harmed from having to provide sensitive information).
process.94  This “hoarding” of orbital slots has resulted in many
disputes with private operators over the ISOs’ “paper satellites.”95  As a
result, the ISOs effectively prevent competitors from obtaining orbital
slots96 or spectrums necessary to operate their systems.97
The ISOs’ sheer size and dominance also provide competitive
advantages.  Operating over twenty satellites, INTELSAT can allocate
a significant portion of its abundant capacity to new services and
developing markets.98  The organization is considerably larger, in
both capacity and volume of services, than any other geostationary
satellite system throughout the world.99  Although Inmarsat is not
quite so large, it is the only provider of global maritime satellite
services.100  This dominance provides the ISOs with capital to expand
into developing markets since they may look to its signatories as well
as the capital markets for financing.101  In addition, commercial
investors view these ISOs as favorable risks because of the signatories’
ties to their governments in most countries.102  In fact, the Alliance for
Competitive International Satellite Services103 (“ACISS”) has reported
that private operators have trouble finding financing for their
prospective systems if those systems will compete with the ISOs.104
                                                       
94. See Notes of Scott Blake Harris, Chief, International Bureau, FCC, from his speech
delivered at the INTELSAT Restructure and Satellite Competition Conference, Columbia
Institute for Tele-information, New York (Apr. 26, 1996), available at <http://www.citi.columbia.
edu/speechsbh.html>.
95. See Wong, supra note 91.  The paper satellite problem refers to the gigantic number of
applications filed with the ITU Radiocommunications Bureau to operate satellite systems at
specific locations in geostationary orbit.  See id. at 850-51.  Abuse of the ITU’s “first come, first
serve” reservations process has caused congestion in the orbital arc by satellite system projects
that exist on paper, but not in reality.  See id. at 851.  INTELSAT maintains its own inventory of
paper satellites in order to hedge against satellite failure.  See id.  Many private operators,
however, accuse INTELSAT of hoarding slots for only speculative purposes.  See id. at 851 n.19
(reserving slots for future multimedia uses).
96. See Satellite Failure Highlights INTELSAT’s Need for Operational Flexibility, SATELLITE WK.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at 1997 WL 7891911 (discussing INTELSAT’s asserted need to retain paper
satellites to hedge against the risk of satellite failure).
97. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 15.
98. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 21.
99. See id.; see also Global Countdown:  Satellite Operators Are Rushing to Establish Networks to
Deliver Services Worldwide, UPLINK, Winter 1996-1997, available at <http://www.spaceway.com/
uplink/archive/up964/global964.html> [hereinafter Global Countdow”] (discussing PanAmSat’s
merger with Galaxy to create a comparable system of 21 geostationary satellites).
100. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 44 (discussing Inmarsat’s public interest role as a
communications link to ailing vessels at sea).  But see Forrester, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing
new satellite systems which will provide mobile satellite services in the near future).
101. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 44 (noting competitors’ concerns about
Inmarsat’s market dominance).
102. See id. (discussing advantages held by Inmarsat from the perspective of investors).
103. See id. at 18 (reporting that ACISS is composed of Columbia Communications Corp.,
Motorola Inc., Odyssey Worldwide Services, Orbital Communications Corporation, Orion
Network Systems, PanAmSat Corporation, and TRW Inc.).
104. See id.
Moreover, when these private companies can secure financing, they
must pay considerably higher interest rates.105
C. Regulatory Advantages
The ISOs also benefit from distinct regulations over their
competition.  The organizations’ treaty status provides certain
privileges and immunities.106  Not only are the ISOs’ earnings exempt
from national taxation, but they are also immune from antitrust and
liability prosecution.107
In 1989, PanAmSat,108 a private U.S. satellite operator, brought suit
against COMSAT alleging a variety of anti-competitive activities.109
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that signatories are
“representatives of the parties,” and that the immunity clause of the
international treaties applied to signatories like COMSAT as well.110
After several years of litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of PanAmSat’s lawsuit in 1997,
holding that PanAmSat failed to present sufficient evidence to
support its charges that COMSAT had violated antitrust laws and
engaged in predatory pricing.111  As a result, the ISOs may act in the
market in ways their competitors cannot because they are immune
from U.S. antitrust laws.
Also, the treaties require that firms that wish to compete with
INTELSAT must coordinate with INTELSAT to ensure they do not
cause the ISOs any significant economic harm or technical
interference.112  These consultations with the ISOs usually require
divulgence of proprietary business information.113  In fact, an FCC
                                                       
105. See id.
106. See Einhorn, supra note 42.
107. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 12.
108. See PANAMSAT, THE COMPANY, available at <http://www.panamsat.com/comp
/company.htm>(visited Nov. 24, 1998) (giving a broad overview of company).
109. See Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. COMSAT Corp., Opinion and
Order, 89 CIV. 5021 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), 59 USLW 2209, rev’d in part, 946 F.2d 168 (1991)
(reporting that plaintiff’s claimed that COMSAT participated in anticompetitive conduct to
squash plaintiff’s ability to enter into the domestic and international markets successfully).
110. See id.
111. See Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. COMSAT Corp., 113 F.3d 372 (2d
Cir. 1997) (explaining that COMSAT’s activities were immune to legal proceedings and could
not be deemed as evidence to support PanAmSat’s antitrust claims); see also PANAMSAT, PRESS
RELEASE, PANAMSAT CALLS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO END COMSAT’S PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES (May 19, 1997), available at <http://www.panamsat.com/news/p051997.htm>
(discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals’ dismissal of PanAmSat’s antitrust lawsuit against
COMSAT).
112. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 12.
113. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 31-32.
approval to operate a system in the United States must first be
predicated by a determination from the ISOs that the prospective
operator will not cause the organization any technical interference or
economic injury.114
Not surprisingly, several disputes between private operators and
the ISOs have arisen.  In one instance, INTELSAT’s consideration of
possible financial impacts of Columbia Communications
Corporation’s system (“Columbia”)115 was a factor in determining that
its satellites would cause INTELSAT unacceptable technical
interference as well.116  Concerned with the possibility that Columbia
would be forced from the market, thus harming competition, the
FCC granted Columbia a continuation of service until a mutually
acceptable solution could be reached.117  One past FCC official
poignantly described the situation when he asked:  “Imagine the
result in the 1970s if MCI had to get permission to compete from the
AT&T Board of Directors?”118  Although the FCC intervened in the
matter, they could not order INTELSAT to concede any of its claims
because of its international immunity.119  Recently, though,
INTELSAT and Columbia reached an amicable resolution in the
matter.120
                                                       
114. See id.
115. See COLUMBIA COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, CORPORATE PROFILE (visited Dec. 11,
1998) <http://www.tdrss.com/profile.html> (providing a broad overview of the company).
116. See Application for Special Temporary Authority to Remove Conditions on its Existing
Authorization to Operate C-Band Transponder Capacity on the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (“TDRSS”) Space Station at
forty-one Degrees West Longitude, Order and Authorization, DA 96-703, 11 FCC Rcd. 13710
(May 6, 1996).  When Columbia’s leased satellites were extended, the company applied to the
FCC for permission to continue operating.  See id. at 13711.  INTELSAT subsequently found
that Columbia’s satellites would create unacceptable interference with its own satellites.  See id.
at 13714.  After INTELSAT’s finding, Columbia filed a new application with the FCC for special
temporary authority to continue service.  See id. at 13715.  Concerned that INTELSAT had
placed its commercial interests in front of its public interest obligations, the FCC granted the
special temporary authority.  See id. at 13719.  The FCC ordered Columbia to negotiate with
INTELSAT to reach a mutually agreeable resolution under the ITU’s provisions and apply for
permanent authority to operate.  See id.
117. See id.
118. Harris, supra note 94.  Harris explained that:
The Columbia incident demonstrates the current moral bankruptcy of an organization
[INTELSAT] that had been designed, in perhaps a more innocent time, to act in the
best interests of all the citizens of the world . . . .  INTELSAT also games the technical
coordination process.  My staff can attest to the countless hours negotiating technical
coordination with INTELSAT on behalf of competing systems—occasionally only to be
able to achieve an acceptable result after high level U.S. government intervention.
Id.
119. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 41, at art. XV.
120. See INTELSAT and Columbia End Battle Over Disputed Slot, SATELLITE NEWS, Dec. 22,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7890511.  Under an agreement reached by INTELSAT and
Columbia, the latter will shift its traffic from the NASA TDRSS 4 satellite it currently leases to an
aging INTELSAT satellite that both companies will share.  See id.  Columbia will stop using
D. Alternative Competition
Although the ISOs have commanding market, competitive, and
regulatory advantages, it does not necessarily follow that there is a
lack of competition in the marketplace.  The growth of alternative
satellite systems and fiber optic cables is cited by COMSAT as
evidence that INTELSAT no longer enjoys market dominance.121  In
fact, INTELSAT’s market shares have decreased since the late 1980s
for all types of services and major geographic routes.122  Declining
market shares alone, however, are not a clear indicator of competitive
pricing because many fiber-optic cables are owned by the same
entities that are signatories to INTELSAT.123  Regardless of which view
is accepted, though, it is clear that the United States and the rest of
the world are on a gliding path towards a more competitive satellite
environment.
III. A REVIEW OF THE TREND TOWARD COMPETITION
A. The Reagan Years
Whereas U.S. policies in the 1960s and 1970s focused on
protection and promotion of the ISOs, competition was at its peak
during the 1980s.124  The domestic telecommunications market was
the first target of this new pro-competitive agenda.125  In the mid-
1980s, after years of monopoly status, AT&T was effectively ordered
to spin off its regional assets.126  The birth of the “baby bells” provided
local telecommunications services, while new companies entered the
long-distance and international phone markets.127  Meanwhile, these
national events had an eventual ripple effect in the international
satellite telecommunications realm.
                                                       
TDRS by May 15, 1998, and will assume ownership of INTELSAT 515, which will be renamed
Columbia 515, and will be the first spacecraft owned by Columbia.  See id.  Columbia will also
move the satellite to 37.5 degrees West and will lease an unspecified number of transponders to
INTELSAT at no charge.  See id.; see also INTELSAT, Columbia Settle Fight over Orbital Slots,
TELECOMMS. REP., Dec. 22, 1997, at 7 (remarking that Columbia 515 will be able to provide
coverage to North and South America, Europe, and Africa at its new location).   
121. See Pfeifenberger & Houthakker, supra note 41 (arguing that INTELSAT faces effective
competition in the marketplace).
122. See id.
123. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 38.
.124. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
125. See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL:  THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S LEADING
CORPORATIONS 293 (1998) (describing the evolution of competition in the domestic
telecommunications market).
126. See id. at 301 (describing the breakup of AT&T and the birth of 22 local operating
companies).
127. See id. at 301-02 (describing the early success of the “baby bells” in providing local
telephone services).
In 1981, the FCC authorized the use of domestic satellites for
transborder communications between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.128  In 1983, several U.S. companies filed applications with the
FCC to establish satellite systems to compete with INTELSAT.129  The
next year, President Ronald Reagan issued Presidential
Determination No. 85-2, which authorized the entrance of these new
competitors into the satellite telecommunications market.130  This
Presidential Determination claimed that such competition was, under
the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, in the national interest of
the United States.131
At the same time, the FCC sought to increase competition in the
international telecommunications sector by ending long-standing
policies protecting the dominance of the ISOs.  Some of these
policies required U.S. telecommunications carriers to place a certain
amount of traffic over the INTELSAT system132 and an intensive
regulatory review of alternative cable applications.133  Bending from
U.S. pressure, INTELSAT began making a series of determinations
that separate satellite systems would not cause it significant economic
harm.134  In response to those changes, the FCC lifted the remaining
restrictions on the types of international satellite services competitors
may provide in 1997.
B. The WTO Basic Agreement on Telecommunications
Like the domestic policies which drove the liberalization of
international telecommunications policies in the 1980s, it appears
that history is repeating itself in the 1990s.  Ironically, the same
policies which were credited with the breakup of AT&T in the 1980s
were overturned with the enactment of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.135  The liberalization of key domestic telecommunications
markets, however, did not result in competition in the international
                                                       
128. See id. at 25.
129. See id. at 25-26.
130. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note, at 16 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
131. See id.
132. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 26-27.  In 1971, the FCC issued guidelines which
required reasonable parity in the use of cables and satellites by AT&T on its transatlantic routes.
See id.  This policy was eliminated in 1988 partly because INTELSAT no longer needed a
guaranteed level of use of its satellites.  See id.
133. See Harris, supra note 94 (discussing past FCC policies designed to protect the ISOs’
market presence).
134. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 32.
135. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see also
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was aimed at
ultimately opening all domestic telecommunications markets to competition).
arena.  Benefits from U.S. pro-competitive policies were not
reciprocated by foreign markets and their governments.136  As a result,
U.S. telecommunications policy also began to focus on liberalizing
international markets.
After several important multilateral trade agreements in the
international arena, telecommunications services were finally
included in the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).137
The newly created World Trade Organization (“WTO”)138 was given
the role of brokering future trade agreements to open up global
telecommunications markets.139  Specifically, the goal of the WTO was
to get countries to agree to open their telecommunications markets
to competition by:  (i) allowing foreign operators to purchase
ownership stakes in domestic telecommunications services; and
(ii) establishing a set of common rules for fair competition in the
telecommunications sector.140  The stakes and arguments for
competition were compelling:  a deal could reduce the average cost
of international telephone calls by eighty percent and save consumers
$1 billion over three years.141
After some last minute negotiating, a deal was finally brokered on
February 15, 1997.142  Under the WTO Basic Telecommunications
Agreement, sixty-eight countries accounting for more than ninety
percent of the world’s telecommunications revenues pledged to
begin opening their markets to foreign competition.143  Most of the
world’s biggest markets, including the United States, European
Union, and Japan, began liberalizing their telecommunications
                                                       
136. See Harwood, supra note 6, at 875-77 (discussing how the benefits of U.S. pro-
competition policies were offset by the disadvantages of unilateral liberalization).
137. See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
138. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ABOUT THE WTO (visited Dec. 11, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/about/agmnts5.htm> (discussing the WTO’s role in overseeing the
operation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services).
139. See id.
140. See WTO PRESS RELEASE, COMMITMENTS IN BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Apr. 30,
1996), available at <http://www.wto.org/press/aprdec-e.htm> (detailing the resolution adopted
by the Council for Trade in Services regarding the Decision on Commitments to Basic
Telecommunications Agreement).
141. See Alan Cane, Getting Through:  Why These Talks Matter, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at 6;
see also WTO PRESS RELEASE, RUGGIERO CONGRATULATES GOVERNMENTS ON LANDMARK
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT (Feb. 17, 1997), available at <http.www.wto.org/wto/
archives/press67.htm> (“Telecommunications liberalization could mean global income gains of
some one trillion dollars over the next decade or so.  This represents about 4% of world GDP at
today’s prices.”).
142. See Frances Williams & Alan Cane, World Telecoms Pact Set to Slash Costs of Calls, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1; see also WTO, PRESS RELEASE, THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON BASIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Feb. 15, 1997), available at <http://www.wto.org/press/summary.htm>
(discussing the negotiation history of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement).
143. See Williams & Cane, supra note 142.
markets on January 1, 1998, when the pact went into effect.144  All
forms of basic telecommunications service are covered, including
voice telephony, data and fax transmissions, and satellite and radio
communications.145
There are two major developments in this agreement which affect
the provision of satellite services around the world.  First, forty-eight
countries signed an agreement to open up their markets for satellite
service.146  These countries represent eighty percent of the total
market for satellite service revenues.147  Of the forty-eight countries
opening up their satellite markets, twenty-two agreed to open up
their markets by January 1, 1998.148  The rest of the commitments will
take effect in 1999.149  Second, sixty-five countries signed the
Reference Paper on Pro-Competitive Regulatory Principles.150  This is
the most significant development because it means that key satellite
markets have committed themselves to a separation of the country’s
telecommunications regulator from its national telecommunications
provider.151
C. Current Restructuring Efforts
1. FCC policy
Leveraging three years of goodwill and momentum amassed by the
WTO negotiations, recent U.S. policy has focused on restructuring
the ISOs.  In May 1996, the FCC issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking known as the Domestic International Satellite
                                                       
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Satellites & The Telecommunications Act, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Communications of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Comm., 104th Congress (1997)
[hereinafter Satellites & Telecoms Act Hearing] (testimony of Steven W. Lett, Deputy U.S.
Coordinator International Communications and Information Policy, U.S. Department of State);
see also Bill Pietrucha, FCC Opens U.S. Markets to Foreign Satellite Operators, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, July 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12352190 (discussing how foreign satellite
operators can bypass the FCC policies that require them to show that their home countries have
already opened up markets to U.S. satellite operators).  But see FCC Opens U.S. Telecom. and
Satellite Markets to Foreign Competition, MOBILE COMM. REP., Dec. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
13198282  (discussing how the FCC’s policies could still apply to non-WTO countries or ISO
affiliates like New Skies).
147. See Satellites & Telecoms Act Hearing, supra note 146 (testimony by Steven W. Lett, Deputy




150. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 16 (testimony of Regina M. Keeney, Chief,
International Bureau, FCC).
151. See id. (mentioning the significance of the large numbers of countries agreeing to
foster more competitive telecommunications environments).
Consolidation Order (“DISCO I”),152 which established criteria to
permit foreign-based operators to offer service in the United States.153
DISCO I proposed a test in which the granting of a license to a
foreign operator to provide services in the United States would be
contingent upon a showing that U.S.-based satellites have effective
competition opportunities (“ECO-SAT test”) in:  (i) the home market
where the foreign operator is licensed; and (ii) all “route markets”
that the foreign satellite intends to service from earth stations in the
United States.154  In light of the recent WTO agreement, however,
DISCO I was reconsidered because the WTO agreement allows
nondiscriminatory access to markets without consideration of where a
foreign operator is licensed.155
With the adoption of the International Satellite Service Order
(“DISCO II”),156 non-U.S. satellite operators from WTO member
countries157 will receive a presumption in favor of access to the U.S.
market for the provision of fixed and mobile services.158  The FCC
adopted this approach for three reasons.  First, the general
obligations created by the WTO Basic Telecoms Agreement provide
                                                       
152. See In the matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-
U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in the
United States, 11 F.C.C.R. 18178 (proposed May 14, 1996) [hereinafter Disco I].
153. See Harwood, supra note 6, at 895 (discussing the Equal Competitive Opportunities
(“ECO”) Test prescribed by DISCO I).
154. See DISCO I, 11 F.C.C.R. at 18187; Cf. Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated
Entities, 11 F.C.C.R. 3873 (1995) [hereinafter Foreign Carrier Entry Order].  The ECO-SAT test
was adapted from the original ECO test set forth in the Foreign Carrier Entry Order in 1995.  See
Disco I, 11 F.C.C.R at 18182.  Under the original ECO test, the FCC looked at:
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carrier’s domestic facilities for the termination and origination of international
services, and whether there are sufficient means to monitor and enforce those
conditions; (3) whether competitive safeguards exist in the foreign country to protect
against anti-competitive practices; and (4) whether there is an effective regulatory
framework in the destination country to develop, implement and enforce legal
requirements, interconnection arrangements, and other competitive safeguards.
Foreign Carrier Entry Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 3890.
155. See Alan Cane, A Ringing Endorsement, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at 19 (quoting Mr. Neil
McMillan, a British civil servant who led the WTO negotiations, as stating, “[t]he developed
countries will get the lion’s share of this market”).
156. Amendment of the Commission’s Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed
Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United States,
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 24094 (1997) [hereinafter DISCO II].
157. See id. at 24118.  A space station operator will have a WTO member designation if the
space station operator is based in a WTO country or relies on a WTO member administration
that grants the license or is responsible for coordinating the system internationally.  See id.
Although a satellite system may have a majority investment from a non-WTO country, other
relevant factors, including the operator’s place of business, will play important roles in
determining whether the operator is from a WTO Member country.  See id.
158. See id. at 24099 (adopting an open entry standard for applicants from WTO member
countries).
insulation against discriminatory conduct.159  Moreover, all WTO
members are governed by the GATT and must comply with its
provisions dealing with transparency and national treatment.160
Second, the increased competitive environment for
telecommunications services, coupled with the regulatory
mechanisms available through the WTO dispute settlement process,
will provide additional protection against harm to U.S. competition.161
Third, classifying WTO members based on their market access
commitments may discourage open entry policies for other countries
intending to implement liberalization policies, as well as negatively
affect trading relations with international partners.162
Pursuant to DISCO II, the FCC will not apply an ECO-SAT test to
WTO member route markets served by non-U.S. satellites licensed by
non-WTO countries.163  This is consistent with the FCC’s rationale
that sufficient protection in the GATT, coupled with regulatory
licensing safeguards, is enough to ensure a competitive U.S. satellite
market.164  An ECO-SAT test will be applied, however, to all non-WTO
route markets served by non-U.S. satellites licensed by non-WTO
countries.165  Because global satellite system operators must obtain
authorizations from all countries to which they seek to provide
service, it is possible that non-WTO countries will prohibit access by
U.S. satellites, while allowing access by other foreign satellites.166  This
scenario could provide another competitor with a competitive
advantage over the U.S. satellite operator due to its extended
coverage area.167  Thus, the home market of non-U.S. satellites is
crucial to the FCC’s ECO-SAT analysis.
DISCO II also provides that, in order for COMSAT to provide U.S.
domestic service via the INTELSAT and Inmarsat systems, COMSAT
must waive any immunities that it derives from its majority ownership
of the systems, as well as show that use of those systems will enhance
                                                       
159. See id. at 24114 (“WTO member that did not make a market access commitment for
satellite services must nonetheless afford no less favorable treatment to a U.S. services than it
does to a system licensed in any other country if the WTO member decides to open its
market.”).
160. See id. (stating that WTO members who open their markets are obligated by GATs to
provide equal treatment to U.S. satellite providers).
161. See id.
162. See id. (stating that excluding WTO members who did not make market access
commitments could raise an “Most Favored Nation” issue).
163. See id. at 24131-32.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 24132.
166. See id.
167. See id.
competition in the U.S. market.168  This measure was taken in
response to U.S. courts which have determined that COMSAT, while
acting in its capacity as U.S. signatory to INTELSAT and Inmarsat,
has immunity from liability under U.S. antitrust laws.169  The FCC has
concluded that this creates an unfair advantage for COMSAT that
must be remedied before COMSAT may serve the U.S. market.170  The
FCC will also treat ISO affiliates the same as other WTO member
licensed systems, but will apply the ECO-SAT test to ISO affiliates
from non-WTO countries.171
2. Inmarsat and ICO Global Communications
Current U.S. satellite policy is further complicated by the
uncertainty created by the restructuring of the ISOs.  In 1994, as an
effort to expand into new markets, Inmarsat established an affiliate,
ICO Global Communications (“ICO”).172  This effort was the first
example of how a treaty organization could restructure by forming an
affiliate partly financed by Inmarsat and its existing signatories.173
Initially, the United States opposed the formation of ICO because of
concerns about the close relationship between Inmarsat, its invested
signatories, and ICO.174
The United States eventually agreed to the formation of ICO on
the condition that several principles of structural separation between
the parent, its owners, and the affiliate be met to promote effective
competitive opportunities.175  These principles included:
(i) nondiscriminatory access to countries’ domestic markets for all
mobile satellite communications networks; (ii) a prohibition on the
                                                       
168. See id. at 24149 (stating that COMSAT is required to make an appropriate waiver of
immunity from any suit as part of its application to provide domestic services via INTELSAT or
Inmarsat).
169. See id. at 24148-49; see also supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (discussing
COMSAT’s immunity from an antitrust suit filed by PanAmSat).
170. See id. (expressing concern that COMSAT’s immunity may harm the U.S. market).
171. See id. at 24155.
172. See Inmarsat Creates Affiliate, Gains U.S. Support, MOBILE SATELLITE NEWS, Dec. 15, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 11221763, at 4-5 (citing COMSAT Mobile Vice President, Ron Mario, as
remarking, “[w]e believe [establishing the Inmarsat affiliate is] the most effective way to
compete against giants such as Motorola.  Inmarsat would be too slow to compete [in the
market]”).
173. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 11.  The Initial Public Offering of ICO’s shares
raised $1.4 billion.  See id.  Inmarsat had a total investment of 10.6% of the voting shares, while
nearly 60% of Inmarsat’s seventy-nine signatories invested directly in ICO.  See id.  These
signatories hold an overwhelming 70% of ICO’s voting shares.  See id.
174. See id. (stating that these concerns included:  (i) the likelihood that Inmarsat’s
signatories would have an obvious incentive to aid ICO, (ii) this close relationship would give
preferential market access to ICO because many of its owners were licensing authorities in their
respective countries as well, and (iii) advantages to accessing capital because of its implicit
government backing).
175. See id. at 12-13.
transfer of spectrum or orbital slots from Inmarsat to ICO; (iii) a ban
on  cross-subsidization176 from Inmarsat; and (iv) a restriction on the
transfer of treaty-based immunities and privileges to ICO.177  To date,
however, ICO has yet to procure a license to operate its system in the
United States.178
Following the relative success of ICO, Inmarsat is considering
several proposals to restructure its own organization.179  In fact,
current efforts include finalizing a privatization plan of Inmarsat
sometime next year.180  Under this restructuring, part or all of
Inmarsat’s existing satellites would be transferred to the private
entity, while a residual organization overseeing Inmarsat’s public
interest goals would also be established.181
Among the United States’ most serious concerns regarding the
current restructuring efforts, is the relationship the newly created
ICO will have with a private Inmarsat.182  In response to this threat,
the United States issued a position paper describing two fundamental
goals to be met in order to gain the support of the United States:
(1) the restructuring must guarantee the provision of global
maritime distress communications services consistent with Inmarsat’s
original mission, and (2) competition enhancement by allowing fair
and equitable market access to all competitors.183
                                                       
176. See id. (reporting that a cross-subsidy occurs if the costs of producing one service are
paid for by consumers of a different service).
177. See id. at 13 (discussing how the owners of ICO voted at its annual meeting on May 28,
1996 to approve and amend ICO’s Articles of Incorporation to accept fully the U.S. conditions).
178. See Theresa Foley, ICO Faces Uphill Struggle for U.S. License, COMM. WK. INT’L, May 4,
1998 (visited Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.totaltele.com/cwi/204/204news19.html> (citing the
reluctance of the FCC to license immediately the ICO system despite international pressure to
do so).
179. See  Inmarsat Assembly Approves Privatization Proposal, TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L, May 1,
1998, at 1.  The Inmarsat Assembly in Parties approved amendments to develop a privatization
model in April 1998, a significant step for Inmarsat to become fully privatized by the end of
1999.  See id. at 2.  The new Inmarsat structure will be composed of two entities:  a public
company and an intergovernmental structure to ensure that Inmarsat’s public service
obligations are met.  See id.; see also Inmarsat Chief Optimistic on Privatization Plans, COMM. TODAY,
Mar. 18, 1998, at 8, 9 (stating that privatization is expected to occur by January 1, 1999).  But see
Delay Said Likely in Inmarsat Privatization, COMM. TODAY, Mar. 26, 1998, at 9 (stating that plans to
privatize Inmarsat by early 1999 may be overly optimistic).
180. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (providing testimony of Regina M.
Keeney, Chief, International Bureau, FCC).
181. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 47-49.  Fully privatizing the organization would
relieve many of the competitive issues currently in controversy with the existing structure of the
ISOs.  See id.  The benefits of creating a private company, however, are offset by the fact that a
future merger with ICO, which is also owned by its signatories, would impede competitors’
access to foreign markets.  See id.
182. See GAO REPORT ‘96, supra note 22, at 13.  Inmarsat is on record as being interested in
a future merger with ICO and a private Inmarsat.  See id.  This relationship would present an
obvious strain on free competition because the owners of these organizations could easily
restrict market access to other competitors.  See id.
183. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 52-53.  According to FCC and Commerce
3. INTELSAT and New Skies Satellites
Amid the ongoing negotiations of Inmarsat, INTELSAT is also
seeking to restructure itself.  The United States and COMSAT have
proposed to spin off part of INTELSAT’s ‘non-core mission’ services,
such as video broadcast, to an affiliate, News Skies Satellites NV
(“New Skies”).184  According to the proposal, the current INTELSAT
would be reduced to roughly half of its current size and would focus
solely on providing basic telecommunications services.185  After a
period of two to three years, New Skies would be relatively
independent because it would consist of eighty percent external
investment.186
The initial proposal further required:  (1) that New Skies not have
any priorities or immunities previously enjoyed by INTELSAT;
(2) ‘arms length’ dealings between the two entities; and (3) no
special access to lucrative orbital slots.187  This proposal is designed to
reduce the financial incentive of INTELSAT’s signatories and to give
New Skies preferential market access by limiting the signatories’
investment to a maximum of twenty percent.188  Under more recent
negotiations, however, this binding external ownership requirement
failed when strong international opposition argued successfully
against it.189  Nonetheless, New Skies would presumably act in
compliance with the antitrust laws of any given country because it
would not retain any of INTELSAT’s immunities.190
It is still unclear, however, whether these concerns will ultimately
be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction.  When Irv Goldstein, Director
General and Chief Executive Officer of INTELSAT, announced
INTELSAT’s intention to turn over six of its communications
                                                       
Department officials, however, Inmarsat owners are uninterested in the U.S. position paper.  See
id.  In fact, its owners would like to see greater government ownership in a restructured
Inmarsat and less external investment.  See id. at 53.  COMSAT has added that ICO’s
incorporation of the United States’ accepted conditions in its Articles of Incorporation are
adequate insurance in ensuring competition in mobile satellite services.  See id.  The ACISS,
however, has pointed out that these provisions are not binding on ICO’s individual signatory




187. See id. at 50.
188. See id. at 49-50 (reporting that according to U.S. officials, the United States is facing
strong opposition to the proposed 20% limit on signatory investments).
189. See Administration Supports Bliley’s Call for Satellite Privatization, Answers Queries on
Procurement, TELECOMMS. REP., Feb. 9, 1998, at 5 (noting that there was “simply . . . no
international support” for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s
(“NTIA”) position).  
190. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 49-50.
satellites to New Skies,191 opponents of the move claimed that this
action had violated earlier concessions that INTELSAT would not
provide New Skies with any preferential market advantages.192  In fact,
supporters of the Bliley Bill immediately denounced the plan and
called for strengthened support of H.R. 1872.193  They argued that
New Skies would gain unfair market access because it would receive a
transfer of assets valued at over $700 million, debt free, while existing
satellite competitors were forced to fund their projects by
themselves.194  Consequently, INTELSAT’s creation of New Skies far
from settled the current debate.  In fact, Congress now appears even
more likely to enact legislation, on its own terms, to guarantee a fully
competitive satellite marketplace.
4. COMSAT
With Inmarsat and INTELSAT’s restructuring efforts as a
backdrop, COMSAT is also lobbying the FCC to classify it as a non-
dominant carrier.  In April 1997, COMSAT filed a petition requesting
a broad overhaul of FCC regulation over COMSAT services provided
over INTELSAT.195  COMSAT requested the elimination of rate of
return regulation, including rate of return prescription, and other
existing structural separation requirements.196
At a recent Senate hearing on satellite reform, COMSAT argued
that it simply does not dominate the marketplace anymore—citing
the growth of undersea fiber optic cables and alternative satellite
systems as evidence of competition.197  COMSAT further advocated
                                                       
191. See INTELSAT Spinoff Strikes Sparks in Satellite Industry, AEROSPACE DAILY, available in
1998 WL 9025841, Feb. 19, 1998 (describing the angst of the satellite communications industry
when INTELSAT announced its plan to form New Skies at the “Satellite 98” conference); Mike
Mills, INTELSAT to Form Separate Company, Critics Say Consortium’s Competitive Advantage Will
Remain, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1998, at C11 (quoting Irv Goldstein as asserting, “New Skies ‘is the
first step in the ultimate commercialization of INTELSAT’”).
192. See Mills, supra note 191, at C11 (explaining that competitors believed that
INTELSAT’s transferring of five of its satellites, providing the start-up with an immediate
annual revenue stream of $200 million, and transfer of other assets valued at additional $700
million, free of debt, would create an unfair market advantage for New Skies); see also Markey
Attacks INTELSAT Spin-Off Plan as ‘Charade,’ TELECOMMS. REP., May 4, 1998, at 15 [hereinafter
Markey Attacks] (noting that INTELSAT plans to give a sixty million dollar loan to New Skies as a
start up gift while many other operators are still paying for their satellite investments).  See
generally INTELSAT’s ‘Inc.’ Plan Takes Heat in U.S., TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L, Mar. 13, 1998, at 15
(giving general insight on the congressional backlash to the proposed INTELSAT spin-off).
193. See Markey Attacks, supra note 192, at 15 (announcing the Alliance for Competitive
International Satellite Services’ support of H.R. 1872).
194. See Mills, supra note 191, at C11 (describing other companies’ satellite investment
obligations).
195. See In the Matter of COMSAT Petition for Partial Relief From the Current Regulatory
Treatment of COMSAT World Systems Video and Audio Services, 12 F.C.C.R. 12059 (1997).
196. See id.
197. See Satellite Reform Hearings, supra note 37 (testimony of Betty Alewine, President and
that its outdated capital structure guidelines, which limit investors
from owning more than ten percent of the company, should also be
eliminated.198  In addition, COMSAT supports the privatization of
INTELSAT, but insists that multilateral negotiations with other
signatories should be carried out, rather than unilateral U.S.
legislative action.199
The FCC finally agreed with COMSAT and granted its petition to
be deregulated and reclassified as a non-dominant carrier one year
later, in April 1998.200  COMSAT was able to convince the FCC that it
faced significant competition from other satellite providers, foreign
satellite operators, and undersea fiber optic cables.201  Based on these
circumstances, the FCC ruled that COMSAT had no monopoly
power, and that regulation of COMSAT as a dominant carrier was
unnecessary and anti-competitive.202  Approximately eighty-five to
ninety percent of COMSAT’s satellite provision service was
deregulated by this historic FCC order.203
Other restrictions remain, however, which could have a negative
impact on the restructuring of COMSAT.  The CS Act allows only
authorized carriers to invest in COMSAT.204  Authorized carriers are
specifically designated as communications common carriers by the
FCC upon a finding that their ownership in COMSAT would be
consistent with the public interest.205  Once deemed an authorized
carrier, such carrier is not allowed to own more than fifty percent of
COMSAT’s voting stock.206  All other investors which are not deemed
authorized carriers by the Commission face even stricter ownership
limits, requiring ownership of COMSAT’s voting stock to not exceed
ten percent.207
On September 19, 1998, Lockheed Martin (“Lockheed”)
                                                       
CEO, COMSAT Corporation) (“Competing with the likes of Hughes, PanAmSat, Loral,
Lockheed Martin, AT&T, British Telecom, MCI, and many, many others, COMSAT is just one
of many players, and at $500 million a year in annual revenues, a relatively small one at that.”).
198. See id. (“We must get approval from the FCC every single year in order to borrow
money or raise equity.  No other telecommunications company is subject to this kind of
oversight and regulation . . . this is simply no way to run a commercial company in today’s
competitive environment.”).
199. See id. (asserting that full privatization of INTELSAT should be supported but that
COMSAT or the United States can achieve this reform on its own).





204. See 47 U.S.C. § 734(b)(1) (1997).
205. See id.
206. See id. § 734(b)(2).
207. See id. § 734(b)(3).
announced its plan to acquire COMSAT for $2.7 billion in a two step
transaction intended to comply with the CS Act’s ownership
restrictions.208  The deal calls for Lockheed to merge COMSAT into
its telecommunications subsidiary, Lockheed Global
Telecommunications (“LGT”), and eventually file for a public
offering.209  In the first step, Lockheed will purchase up to forty-nine
percent of COMSAT at $45.50 per share.210  Under this first phase,
the Commission must grant approval to the merger of COMSAT’s
common carrier unit into LGT, then designate the combined entity
an “authorized carrier” under the CS Act.211  By being first designated
an “authorized carrier,” Lockheed could purchase up to forty-nine
percent of COMSAT without running afoul of the CS Act’s
provisions.212
The next step calls for Lockheed to acquire the remaining shares
(fifty-one percent) of COMSAT in a stock swap.213  One share of
Lockheed stock would be worth two COMSAT shares.214  Under this
second phase, the CS Act would have to be amended to allow
Lockheed to purchase more than ten percent of COMSAT’s voting
stock.215  As noted earlier, the CS Act forbids more than ten percent
ownership of COMSAT’s voting stock by any stockholder.216
Although it is likely that the Commission will grant the requisite
approval for the merger, changing the CS Act to allow for more than
ten percent ownership may prove more problematic.217  Recent
legislation passed by the House indicates that the merger would
receive support in changing the ten percent ownership cap on
COMSAT.218  Under the Bliley Bill, the Commission would have been
ordered to treat COMSAT as a non-dominant carrier for the
                                                       
208. See Lockheed Martin-COMSAT Deal Must Clear 5 Hurdles, SATELLITE WK., Sept. 28, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 10711113 [hereinafter Lockheed/COMSAT Deal] (discussing the
Lockheed/COMSAT merger).
209. See id. (detailing the five hurdles that Lockheed must overcome to acquire COMSAT).
210. See Lockheed Martin’s Planned Buyout of COMSAT Will Build Satellite Services, SATELLITE
NEWS, Sept. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6614639 [hereinafter COMSAT Buyout] (discussing





215. See id. (noting that “the second phase requires government regulators to relax existing
restrictions that limit any organization from buying more than 10% of COMSAT’s voting
stock”).
216. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (setting out the requirements of the CS
Act).
217. See COMSAT Buyout, supra note 210 (recognizing that Senate approval of the merger
remains doubtful in light of the necessity of relaxing existing government restrictions).
218. See id. (recalling that the House overwhelmingly passed a bill to privatize COMSAT).
Commission’s regulations,219 as well as allow COMSAT’s competitors
direct access to the INTELSAT and Inmarsat systems.220  These “direct
access” provisions imply that COMSAT’s ownership cap would be
lifted.221
Other obstacles this merger must face include obtaining
shareholder approval by COMSAT shareholders, as well as satisfy any
antitrust concerns.222  It is likely that the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) will have peripheral involvement in handling review of this
merger because of the FTC’s expertise in dealing with aerospace
antitrust issues.223  In large part, this deal would not raise antitrust
concerns because the businesses being merged have little overlap.224
Lockheed, a traditional defense and aerospace manufacturing giant,
is attempting to access the very profitable satellite communications
industry.225  Because this merger does not involve an aggregation of a
specific market, it is likely that the merger will pass antitrust
concerns.226
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A. H.R. 1872—The Bliley Bill
The recent restructuring efforts have also set the stage for Congress
to review the ISOs’ role in the new telecommunications environment.
In June 1997, Representative Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), Chairman of the
U.S. House Commerce Committee, introduced H.R. 1872, the
“Communications Satellite Competition and Privatization Act of
                                                       
219. The FCC granted COMSAT’s petition for non-dominant status on April 28, 1998,
independent of H.R. 1872.  See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text (discussing the
negotiations underlying this agreement).
220. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. § 641 (1998) (outlining the deregulation of COMSAT as a
nondominant carrier).
221. See id. § 641.  Although H.R. 1872 recently died with the recess of Congress, it passed
overwhelmingly in the House and is expected to be reintroduced when Congress reconvenes.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  But see Congress Asks FCC to Freeze Merger, TELECOMMS
REP. INT’L, Jan. 29, 1999, at 3 (stating that some members of Congress would like the FCC to
delay approval of LGT as an “authorized common carrier” until Congress addresses the broader
question of comprehensive satellite reform legislation).
222. See Lockheed/COMSAT Deal, supra note 208 (stating that one of the hurdles Lockheed
must clear in order to merge with COMSAT is obtaining clearance under Hart-Scott-Rodino
provisions of the antitrust laws).
223. See id.
224. See Frederic M. Biddle & John Simons, Lockheed Martin Hopes COMSAT Will Fuel Bottom
Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1998, at B4 (discussing the relatively low antitrust concerns posed by
this merger).
225. See id.
226. See id.  One analyst commented on the merger, “[i]n the case of COMSAT and
Lockheed Martin, it doesn’t create an issue of market aggregation and doesn’t put Lockheed
Martin into a substantial position that would be an antitrust issue.”  Id.
1997,” which sought to amend the Communications Satellite Act of
1962.227  Co-sponsored by Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), the Bliley
Bill sought to make dramatic changes in the U.S. regulation of the
ISOs.228  The Bliley Bill received tremendous support from the
satellite industry upon its initial introduction.229  Meanwhile, the
Senate Subcommittee on Communications initiated its own
investigations into the matter.230  If the restructuring efforts by the
ISOs are perceived by Capitol Hill to be detrimental to U.S.
competitive interests abroad, then it is likely that legislative mandates
will follow.  Based on strong congressional support during 105th
Congress, the Bliley Bill could well be the catalyst for such legislation
in the future.
Specifically, the Bliley Bill would have required the FCC to limit or
revoke authority from the ISOs to provide non-core services to, from,
or within the United States unless the ISOs, and their successor
entities, have been privatized in a manner which does not harm
competition in U.S. telecommunications markets.231  The Bliley Bill
called for the privatization of Inmarsat by January 1, 2001, and
INTELSAT by January 1, 2002.232  During its restructuring, the Bliley
                                                       
227. See Bipartisan Effort Led by Chairman Bliley to Set Pro-Competitive Framework for INTELSAT
Privatization, BUS. WIRE, June 12, 1997, available in WL 6/12/97 Bus. Wire 18:52:00 (discussing
PanAmSat’s approval of Chairman Bliley’s introduction of H.R. 1872).
228. See Satellite Act Would Privatize INTELSAT/Inmarsat, COMM. TODAY, June 16, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10863992 (quoting Rep. Bliley stating, “[t]his legislation is designed to
fully privatize INTELSAT and Inmarsat on a model based on free and fair competition”).
229. See IXCs Release Report Backing Satellite Reform Legislation, TELECOMMS. REP., Mar. 9, 1998,
at 25 (discussing the support by U.S. interexchange telephone carriers for the Bliley Bill
because it will have a total cost savings in the industry of about one billion dollars over ten years
and total consumer benefits, including lower prices, of about $1.5 billion over the same
period); Satellite Circuit, SATELLITE NEWS, June 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7890288 (quoting
Russell Daggat, President of Teledasic Corp. as saying, “Teledesic strongly supports Chairman
Bliley’s and Rep. Markey’s continuing efforts to further encourage competition in the
international satellite industry”); see also PanAmSat Applauds U.S. Moves to Privatize INTELSAT,
EXCHANGE TELECOMMS. NEWSL., June 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10406788 (explaining how
PanAmSat “commends chairman Bliley for his tireless efforts to ensure an equal playing field
for satellite service providers, which ultimately will translate into better and more varied services
for consumers in the United States and around the world”); Satellite Bill, TELECOMMS. REP.
INT’L, Nov. 21, 1997, at 8 (discussing industry support for the Bliley Bill); Bliley Repeats Call for
Satellite Reform Cites Letters from FCC, COMSAT, TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L, Jan. 16, 1998, at 10
(citing letters from the FCC and COMSAT which indicate that “satellite reform . . . is urgently
needed”).
230. See UNITED STATES SENATE, PRESS RELEASE, BURNS ANNOUNCES SATELLITE HEARING
(June 10, 1997), available at <http://www.senate.gov/~burns/p970610a.htm>.  Montana
Senator Conrad Burns, Chairman of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Subcommittee on Communications, announced his intentions to hold hearings on the topic,
“International Satellite Reform:  Is Technology Outpacing Regulation?”  See id.  The main
themes of the hearings were:  (1) competitive neutrality of proposed regulations; (2) ensuring
universal service to consumers worldwide; (3) privatization of the ISOs; and (4) promotion of
market access to foreign competitors.  See id.
231. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. (1998).
232. See id. § 602 (asserting that the “President shall oppose, and the Commission shall not
Bill would have limited the ISOs’ expansion of services into new
markets until full privatization was completed, unless the FCC
determined that there was “continued progress” toward a pro-
competitive environment.233  In addition, the Bliley Bill prohibits the
FCC from assisting in the registration of new orbital slots for
INTELSAT and Inmarsat until the ISOs are fully privatized.234  Next,
the Bliley Bill directs the President and the FCC to initiate
multilateral negotiations with the ISOs’ current signatories to
establish a pro-competitive privatization of the ISOs.235  Finally, the
Bliley Bill would strip the immunities and privileges of COMSAT and
allow other companies direct access to the INTELSAT and Inmarsat
systems.236
B. A Unilateral Approach
The current undertaking by Congress represents a unilateral
approach to restructuring the ISOs.  In effect, the Bliley Bill
promotes the use of the lucrative U.S. telecommunications market as
a ‘carrot’ to induce other signatories to comply with U.S. goals.  The
FCC has jurisdiction over the licensing of foreign satellite operators’
access to U.S. markets through its authority to approve the
establishment of earth stations that service the foreign satellite
systems.237  The Bliley Bill would force the FCC to refuse licensing to
the ISOs if certain conditions were not met.238  Because of the ISOs’
desire to do business in the U.S. market, it is argued that the Bliley
Bill would ensure compliance with U.S. competition policies.
With regard to any successor entities to the ISOs, the Bliley Bill
proposes that an initial public offering of its shares should be held
                                                       
assist,” any requests for new orbital slots from INTELSAT after January 1, 2002, and Inmarsat
after January 1, 2001).
233. See id. § 603 (citing to the additional services authorized during continued progress);
see also House Panel Amends Satellite Privatization Bill; Industry Gloats, Prepares for Next Skirmishes,
TELECOMMS. REP., Mar. 23, 1998, at 8 [hereinafter Industry Gloats] (describing the compromise
reached between supporters of COMSAT and the Bliley staff to allow flexibility for “stand still”
provisions in the Bliley Bill).
234. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. § 601(c) (1998).
235. See id. § 661 (1998).  The Bliley Bill calls for the multilateral negotiations to meet the
specified criteria:  (1) successor and separated entities are national, stock corporations
independent of signatories and control access to telecommunications markets and of any
intergovernmental organizations; (2) preferential treatment is terminated; (3) expansions into
new markets are prohibited; (4) successor entities must apply for national licensing and orbital
and spectrum assignments; (5) such entities are domiciled in countries parties to the WTO
Basic Telecom. Agreement; (6) any unused orbital slots be returned to the ITU; and (7) the
ISOs assets are audited before transfer.  See id.
236. See id. § 621.
237. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 25-26.
238. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC’s application of the
ECO-SAT test to ISOs if certain competitive conditions were not met).
within one year after any decision to create any separate entity.239  All
privileges and immunities would be waived regarding transactions
between INTELSAT and New Skies, and none of its officers,
directors, or employees would be shared.240  The Bliley Bill calls for
the United States to assess whether the number of competitors,
including private operators and ISO spin-offs, would be sufficient to
create a fully competitive market.241  The FCC would be granted
exclusive authority to determine whether the outcome of the
restructuring talks would harm competition in the U.S. market.
Furthermore, the Bliley Bill seeks to stop the expansion of the ISOs
into new markets like the Internet, hand-held satellite phones, and
direct to home (“DTH”) or direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) video
services.242  In doing so, these ISOs would be prevented from using
any of their current competitive advantages to monopolize these new
markets.  For example, INTELSAT recently registered ten orbital
slots in the Ka-band to pursue possible opportunities in multimedia
markets.243  The Bliley Bill would not only prohibit INTELSAT from
entering this market, but also from transferring these orbital slots to
New Skies.  Under the Bliley Bill, COMSAT would additionally be
included in these “standstill provisions,” and its services would be
limited or even eliminated in some areas.  But as noted earlier, later
amendments to the Bliley Bill allowed the ISOs to enter these new
markets if the FCC determined there was “continued progress”
toward a pro-competitive privatization of the ISOs.244  Otherwise,
these “standstill provisions” would prevent an ISO from using its
privileges and immunities to enter the market for newer, non-core
services for it or its successor entities if privatization was not
                                                       
239. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. (1998).
240. The Bliley Bill omitted any discussion regarding ICO because it had already spun off
from Inmarsat.
241. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. §§ 622(1), 624(3) (1998) (providing the criteria for
determining the proper number of competitors for INTELSAT and Inmarsat).
242. See id. § 681(13) (describing other services as high speed data transfer and Ka-band
services).
243. See Harris, supra note 94; see also House Testimony Favors ISO Privatization; COMSAT
Attacks Bliley-Markey Legislation, TELECOMMS. REP., Oct. 6, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter House
Testimony] (describing how INTELSAT has retained three-degree spacing between its satellites,
although the United States has since gone to two degree spacing, in an effort to hog orbital
spaces for future uses); Henry Wong, The Emerging Satellite Services Sector:  New Opportunities for
Investment, J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY, Fall 1998, at 9.  Proposed Ka-Band satellite communications
makes available a higher band width two-way broadcasting frequency than exists in traditional
Ku-Band communications.   See id. at 9.  These high speed Ka-band systems will enable the
transmission of voice, video, and data at 500 times the speed of today’s terrestrial networks.  See
id.
244. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Industry Gloats, supra note 233, at 8 (noting
that progress would be examined at annual milestones leading to complete INTELSAT
privatization by Jan. 1, 2002 and full Inmarsat privatization by Jan. 1, 2001).
completed in a competitive manner.
C. Opposition to H.R. 1872
While it was apparent from testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives that there was consensus favoring privatization of
INTELSAT and Inmarsat,245 representatives and supporters of the
ISOs spoke strongly against any unilateral U.S. action.246  Opposition
to the Bliley Bill brought forth several issues which must be settled
before H.R. 1872 will be enacted.  In particular, these parties believe
that unilateral action by the United States may be viewed in an
unfavorable manner by the international community.  Although
Congress believed the United States should lead the way in
developing a competitive satellite market, the Bliley Bill threatens
months and months of restructuring talks facilitated by the
Administration.247  Meanwhile, INTELSAT has continually reaffirmed
its mission and place in the evolving satellite industry and suggested
that such unilateral action would result in a loss of established
goodwill with other countries.248
At the heart of this debate are the rigid timetables for privatization
contained in the Bliley Bill.  The Bliley Bill would require Inmarsat to
fully privatize by 2001, and INTELSAT to privatize by 2002.249
Opponents question whether the Bliley Bill’s timetables are realistic
since consensus by all the parties is required before privatization is
                                                       
245. See U.S. Industry, Officials Favor Privatization, TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L, Oct. 10, 1997, at 4.
There was “a remarkable amount of agreement among representatives of Congress, the
Administration, and the satellite industry that INTELSAT and Inmarsat should be privatized.”
Id. at 4.  COMSAT, on the other hand, strongly opposed the unilateral approach, and some
Democrats on the Commerce Committee feared that such unilateral legislation could lead to
an international backlash, thereby harming U.S. industry.  See id.; see also Administration Supports
Bliley’s Call for Satellite Privatization, Answers Queries on Procurement, TELECOMMS. REP., Feb. 9, 1998
(referring to the Administration’s support for the Bliley Bill); NTIA Supports Bliley’s Call for
Privatization, TELECOMMS. REP. INT’L, Feb. 13, 1998, at 17 (discussing the NTIA’s support of the
Bliley Bill amid the intensive negotiations ongoing with other INTELSAT parties to spin off
New Skies).
246. See Timothy Shea, Why INTELSAT Privatization will Backfire, COMM. WK. INT’L, Apr. 1,
1998, available in 1998 WL10361202 (reporting the weaknesses of the Bliley Bill and offering
support for the ISOs); Group Voice Worries About Restructuring Bill, TELECOMMS. REP., Mar. 2,
1998, at 14 (citing letters by the shipping industry which express concern over the possible
elimination of Inmarsat’s global maritime distress and safety services if privatization is not
completed in a pro-competitive manner).
247. See id.
248. See Satellite Reform Hearings, supra note 37, (testimony of Irving Goldstein, Director
General of INTELSAT); see also Administration, Industry Grapple over Steering Wheel in Senate’s
Cruise to Satellite Restructuring, TELECOMMS. REP., Aug. 4, 1997, at 3 (noting that the greatest
impediment to reforming the ISOs is fear that private operators would not provide
nondiscriminatory service to all countries).
249. See In Satellite Restructuring Bill, Bliley calls for Privatizing INTELSAT, Inmarsat,
TELECOMMS. REP., June 16, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Satellite Restructuring Bill] (describing the
details of the Bliley Bill).
initiated.  Moreover, these same parties have rejected several U.S.
covenants already in its restructuring talks.250  Some members of the
House Commerce Committee urged caution regarding the
legislation’s effects on U.S. foreign policy.251  In fact, panelists at a
recent House hearing warned that the Bliley Bill may be seen as a
thinly veiled attempt to eliminate the ISOs and to allow U.S.-based
private companies to dominate international markets.252  Such a
perception would outrage and further complicate restructuring
efforts undertaken by the Administration.253
This fear of international backlash culminated when the Bliley Bill
was amended to offer some flexibility into the initial rigid
timetables.254  Under the amended Bliley Bill, the FCC will begin a
“phase-in” privatization review of INTELSAT, effective immediately
until full privatization is completed by 2002.255  Under this new
language, INTELSAT may offer additional services if:
(1) By June 1, 1999, COMSAT must submit a proposed “resolution”
calling for the privatization to the INTELSAT Board of Governors,
and the U.S. government must submit the same resolution to an
Assembly of Parties;256
(2) By Jan. 1, 2000, INTELSAT must create a working party to
consider the resolution;257
(3) By Jan. 1, 2001, the resolution would have to be approved by an
INTELSAT Assembly of Parties;258 and
(4) By Jan. 1, 2002, the “pro-competitive privatization” would have
to be completed.259
Bliley Bill supporters believe these annual milestones will
guarantee the full privatization of INTELSAT in a pro-competitive
                                                       
250. See GAO REPORT ‘97, supra note 1, at 52-53 (stating that Inmarsat members have been
generally uninterested in U.S. views).
251. See House Testimony, supra note 243 (quoting committee member Albert Wynn (D-Md.)
as stating, “[w]e are proposing to dismantle two satellite systems that have served the world well.
Before we take this step, I believe it’s crucial that the members . . . understand what the
consequences will be”).
252. See Satellite Restructuring Bill, supra note 249 (reporting that an industry source stated,
“[r]equiring the FCC and the Executive Branch to dictate the privatization of two international
organizations is unlikely to provoke a cooperative response among other parties”).
253. See Satellite Bill Gets Ticket for House Floor; INTELSAT Debates Spin-off in Brazil Meetings,
TELCOMMS. REP., Mar. 30, 1998, at 4 (explaining how some INTELSAT parties have suggested
that the U.S. “dissociate” itself from current negotiations involving the spin-off of New Skies
because of the unilateral action contemplated in Congress).
254. See Industry Gloats, supra note 233, at 8 (discussing the amendments to the Bliley Bill).
255. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. § 603(b) (1998).
256. See id. § 603(b)(2).
257. See id. § 603(b)(3).
258. See id. § 603(b)(4).
259. See id. § 603(b)(5).
fashion.
Instilling flexibility into the privatization timetables, however, is not
enough to guarantee the Bliley Bill’s success.  COMSAT vehemently
opposed the “standstill provisions” included in the Bliley Bill which
would prohibit it from entering new markets until after 2001.260
Furthermore, the new language will also implement a “fresh look”
provision which offers existing COMSAT customers to renegotiate
their contracts during the privatization process of INTELSAT and
Inmarsat.261  At a recent Senate hearing, COMSAT argued that
implementation of these principles would affect current negotiations
with customers for the provision of these services, and this in return
would result in a tremendous economic loss to both its shareholders
and customers.262  However, PanAmSat disputed this position by
claiming that any existing contracts could be ‘grandfathered’ into the
privatization process.263  Despite these restrictions, COMSAT would
receive its long coveted status as a ‘non-dominant’ carrier.  As noted
earlier, COMSAT has already been deemed a ‘non-dominant’ carrier
by the FCC, irrespective of the Bliley Bill.264
Besides questioning the current restructuring efforts, the
Administration has raised additional issues regarding the Bliley Bill.
The Commerce Department, representing the Administration, has
stated it does not ‘fully concur’ with the part of the Bliley Bill that
would give the FCC “exclusive authority to determine the suitability
or competitiveness of the outcome” of restructuring negotiations.265
The Administration feels that determination should be a shared
                                                       
260. See Satellite Reform Hearings, supra note 37 (testimony of Betty Alewine, President and
CEO, COMSAT Corporation); see also Congress Told of Need to Restructure ISOs, TELECOMMS. REP.
INT’L, Aug. 15, 1997, at 9 (describing COMSAT’s views of the standstill provisions as being
“harsh, punitive, and confiscatory”).
261. See H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. § 642 (1998).
262. See Satellite Reform Hearings, supra note 37 (testimony of Betty Alewine, President and
CEO, COMSAT Corporation); House Panel Clears INTELSAT Privatization Measure, COMM.
TODAY, Mar. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5265254 (reporting that the “fresh look” provisions
would allow customers to cancel $523 million in contracts beginning in 2000); see also Bill to
Privatize INTELSAT Cleared by House Panel, COMM. TODAY, Mar. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL
5265173 (explaining that the “fresh look” provisions may also cause COMSAT to sue the U.S.
government for potential damages if COMSAT cannot deliver the services it has already
contracted since May 12, 1997).
263. See Satellite Reform Hearings, supra note 37 (testimony by James Cuminale, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel of PanAmSat).
264. See COMSAT General Counsel Calls for ‘Pro-Competitive’ Legislation; Tells Lawmakers H.R.
1872 Will Raise Prices, Close Markets and Restrict Consumer Satellite Choice, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 30,
1997, available at WL 9/30/97 PR Newswire 09:41:00 (citing COMSAT’s desire for the FCC to
consider its petition for non-dominant status on its merits alone and not be incorporated into
the provisions of this Bliley Bill).
265. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 22 (testimony of Jack Gleason, Associate
Administrator of International Affairs at the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration).
undertaking by both the Executive Branch and the FCC due to the
ongoing restructuring talks of the ISOs.266  Even if both the
Administration and the FCC shared in the duty to determine
competitiveness, language in the Bliley Bill assessing the amount of
competition in the U.S. marketplace remains vague, and therefore
potentially problematic.267
The Administration also pointed out constitutional concerns
regarding the Bliley Bill based on its instruction to the President to
negotiate within a specified criteria.268  These provisions could
interfere with the President’s foreign policy prerogatives and his
constitutional right to conduct diplomatic exchanges in the manner
he sees fit.269  Consequently, any pro-competitive satellite legislation
must overcome these issues before success can be achieved.
D. S. 2365–-The Burns Bill
The Bliley Bill passed in the House of Representatives by a 403-16
vote, and is currently under review by the Senate.270  The Senate, too,
has joined the restructuring efforts by proposing a similar version to
the Bliley Bill.  This version, entitled the “International Satellite
Communications Reform Act of 1998” (the “Burns Bill”),271 was
introduced by Senator Conrad Burns on July 28, 1998 and is also
aimed at restructuring the ISOs, albeit in a less aggressive fashion.272
Unlike the Bliley Bill, the flexible Burns Bill calls for the sale of both
INTELSAT and Inmarsat by 2003, and lacks some of the tougher
threats of the Bliley Bill, including the ability to terminate access to
                                                       
266. See id.
267. See Satellite Restructuring Bill, supra note 249 (pointing out one industry source who
stated that if he were drafting the Bliley Bill, he would “sharpen his pencil” to make pro-
competitive provisions more specific).
268. See Satellite Comp. Hearings, supra note 1, at 22 (testimony of Jack Gleason, Associate
Administrator of International Affairs at the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration) (citing specifically constitutional concerns about § 648 of H.R. 1872 which
required the Executive office to consult with Congress prior to each meeting with INTELSAT or
Inmarsat Assembly of Parties, INTELSAT Board of Governors, and the Inmarsat Council and
§ 661 which mandated that the President secure the “pro-competitive privatizations in a manner
that meets the [FCC Licensing] criteria”).
269. See id.
270. See Mills, supra note 11, at E5 (reporting that supporters successfully promoted the Bill
“as benefiting U.S. consumers by allowing more competition in the growing world-wide satellite
market”).
271. See S. 2365, 105th Cong. (1998) (describing the objective of the Bill as “[t]o amend the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to promote competition and privatization in satellite
competition”).
272. See Bill Piertruchd, Burns Bill Looks to Privatize Satellite Industry, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, July 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11724733 (explaining that the Burns Bill’s
provisions are not as tough as the Bliley Bill’s).
the lucrative U.S. market.273  Another significant difference between
the bills is that the Bliley Bill allows companies to renegotiate existing
contracts with COMSAT beginning in 2000, while the Burns Bill does
not require such a “fresh look” provision.274  As noted earlier,
COMSAT does not favor “fresh look” provisions because it gives
existing customers the ability to cancel their contracts, forcing
COMSAT to essentially renegotiate the contract on less favorable
terms.275
E. The Breaux Bill
A related draft bill (“Breaux Bill”) proposed by Senator John
Breaux also attempts to force a pro-competitive privatization of the
ISOs.276  Similar to the Burns Bill, the Breaux Bill does not include
“fresh look” provisions.277  In contrast, though, the Breaux Bill would
effectively codify into law certain provisions which required the FCC
to verify the independence of ISO affiliates like New Skies and ICO
before granting a license.278  These provisions are the same provisions
first set forth in the FCC’s DISCO II Order.279
Because of the differing approaches that each bill takes, it is likely
that any final piece of legislation will be a compromise between the
Bliley, Burns, and Breaux Bills.  How and to what extent the ISOs
move forth with privatization will undoubtedly determine whether a
more harsh approach is used or a more flexible one.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A REVISED WORKING MODEL OF H.R. 1872
While there are many advantages to unilateral U.S. legislative
action, H.R. 1872, in its present form, fails to take into account many
of the aforementioned issues, including the rigid timetables for
privatization.  This Comment focuses on three major areas of the
Bliley Bill; advocating to affirm one, but proposing to compromise
and amend two others.  First, as advised by the Bliley Bill, the
lucrative U.S. market should be used as a market incentive for the
ISOs to comply with competitive standards.  Second, the flexibility
inherent in the Burns Bill was essential to providing a final








279. See id.; see also supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text (discussing DISCO II’s ECO-
SAT test).
framework for ISO restructuring.  Finally, this flexibility was
particularly important when establishing timetables for privatization
and facilitating cooperation between the Administration and
Congress.  Accordingly, this Comment provides a working model
towards these three stated goals.
A. Market Incentives
Given the emerging telecommunications environment,280
signatories to the ISOs must be induced through market incentives in
order to favor pro-competitive policies.  The heart of H.R. 1872
accomplishes this by forcing the signatories to consider the lucrative
U.S. market when contemplating the restructure of the ISOs.
Signatories from less developed countries must also be convinced
that a free market will provide nondiscriminatory satellite service to
its people as well.  Given the number of global satellite systems
scheduled to launch in the next few years,281 continued liberalization
of worldwide regulations will make it easier for these companies to
invest in foreign markets.282  In particular, these companies will likely
look to the lucrative U.S. marketplace for service opportunities.
Therefore, the market incentives already contemplated in the Bliley
Bill should be retained in any revised version of H.R. 1872.
B. Preventing International Backlash
Despite the inclusion of market incentives, other issues need to be
resolved in order to prevent international backlash and unfair
treatment of the ISOs.  There is a concern by many that sections
621(1)(A) and (B) of the Bliley Bill impose too harsh a timetable for
the ISOs to privatize283 by requiring Inmarsat to be privatized by 2001
and INTELSAT the following year.  Although the new amendments
seek to “phase in” privatization of the ISOs, it is doubtful that this
alone will garner international support.
These concerns stem from developing countries’ doubts that
                                                       
280. See discussion supra Part I (addressing the history of ISOs).
281. See Via Satellite’s Global Satellite Survey 1997 (visited Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.phillips.
com/satellite/survey/new1.htm>.  Geostationary Communications Satellite launches are
projected to reach 250 launches by Year 2000.  See id.  In the 1980s, a mere sixty-nine satellites
were launched.  See id.; see also Via Satellite’s Satellite Industry Trends and Statistics 1997 (visited
Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www.phillips.com/satellite/survey/new12.htm>.  North American
satellites contribute to 24% of the world’s total market.  See id.  The United States dominates the
satellite market in more than 42 countries.  See id.
282. See discussion supra Part I.A (describing market advantages).
283. See Competition Report, supra note 43 (discussing INTELSAT’s declining market share
due to the entrance of alternative providers of telecommunications services at prices
comparable to those charged by INTELSAT).  See discussion supra Part IV.A.
private operators could offer the same nondiscriminatory services to
their countries by 2001.  Based on current technology and an
increase in demand, however, private actors could arguably meet the
ISOs’ current levels of service and price.  Although private operators
will likely be able to meet this demand by 2001,284 a more flexible
deadline should still be included in the Bliley Bill.
In order to hedge against this risk, a revised H.R. 1872 should
include provisions for granting possible extensions to the ISOs.  To
accomplish this, Section 601 should be amended to include Section
601(e):
(e) GRANTING OF EXTENSION FOR COMPETITION TEST
CONSIDERATION.
(1)  PETITION FOR EXTENSION—INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or
any successor entities, may petition the Commission to grant
temporary relief from the licensing criteria in sections 621, 622,
and 624 for an additional six (6) months, after the passing of the
privatization dates outlined in this Section.
(A) INTELSAT must file for petition for temporary relief at least
six (6) months before the privatization date indicated in Sec.
621(1)(A) of this Act, or at least six (6) months before any other
deadline established by the Commission after the passing of the
initial privatization date.
(B) Inmarsat must file for petition for temporary relief at least six
(6) months before the privatization date indicated in Sec.
621(1)(B) of this Act, or at least six (6) months before any other
deadline established by the Commission after the passing of the
initial privatization date.
(C) Petitions for extension filed with the Commission shall be
subject to notice and comment.
(2) CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING EXTENSION:
(A) Upon petition by INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or any successor
entities, for temporary relief, it must show in its petition:
(i) reasons why it has failed to privatize in a competitive manner
that does not harm competition in the telecommunications
markets of the United States;
(ii) an outline of the restructuring plan it intends to undertake in
the next six months so it does not harm competition in the
telecommunications markets of the United States;
(iii) a date in which it believes restructuring may be completed so it
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next few years).
does not harm competition in the telecommunications markets of
the United States; and
(iv) any other factors or reasons it feels the Commission should
consider in the determination of its petition.
(B) The Commission shall consider the following as relevant
factors in its determination to grant or not grant an extension:
(i) Whether INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or any successor entities, have
restructured in good faith so it does not harm competition in the
telecommunications markets of the United States;
(ii) Whether INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or any successor entity, is
likely to succeed in restructuring so it does not harm competition
in the telecommunications markets of the United States;
(iii) Whether a granting of an extension is likely to facilitate a
restructuring of INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or any successor entities,
in a manner that does not harm competition in the
telecommunications markets of the United States.
(3) GRANTING OF EXTENSION.
(A)  Upon granting of any extension by the Commission, the
temporary relief shall be afforded INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or any
successor entities, for up to one (1) additional year, but not less
than six (6) months.
(B) Upon the granting of any extension by the Commission,
INTELSAT or Inmarsat, or any successor entities, may file for
additional extensions if needed.
The addition of these provisions provides several advantages.  First,
section 601(e) would protect the United States from international
backlash by allowing the ISOs more time if they are not fully
privatized by the Bliley Bill’s deadlines.285  This measure fosters a level
of goodwill between the United States and foreign countries because
it ensures that multilateral negotiations will be given due deference
before any unilateral decision is made.286  Second, the Bliley Bill
would clearly outline the requirements of an extension and the
considerations which the Commission will take into affect in granting
an extension.  Once again, this gives ISOs the required flexibility they
may need to protect against last minute hedging by other countries.287
                                                       
285. See House Testimony, supra note 243 (citing John Dingell (D-Mich.) warning that the
Bliley Bill could provoke international backlash by dictating privatization and then imposing
sanctions on the ISOs if the deadlines were not met).
286. See id. (stating that the Commerce Department noted that most parties to the ISOs “see
U.S. efforts at privatization as a thinly veiled American conspiracy to promote market
dominance by U.S. companies”).
287. See id. (reporting that Regina M. Keeney, Chief of the FCC International Bureau, stated
that the somewhat rigid privatization terms could be given more flexibility to reach goals in
Third, these provisions allow continued involvement by the FCC in
determining if the United States will shut its markets to the ISOs.
This allows the U.S. delegation to leverage this ‘wild card’ during
restructuring negotiations until pro-competitive policies are met.288
Fourth, this process will be subject to public notice and comment.
This guarantees that the satellite industry will have a voice in whether
or not to grant an extension.
Finally, this measure is a fair compromise between the Burns and
Bliley Bills.  The Burns Bill would ease privatization requirements
until 2003.  The proposed amendments would accomplish both the
Bliley Bill’s stated goals of privatization by 2002, but allow flexibility
for the Burns Bill’s 2003 deadline.  As a result, these provisions may
be incorporated into a revised H.R. 1872 to circumvent concerns
regarding the rigidity of the current timetables.
C. Fostering Cooperation Between the FCC and the Administration
The Administration is on record that it does not “fully concur” with
provisions in section 601 that provide the FCC with sole authority to
determine the competitiveness of the outcome of restructuring
talks.289  The FCC, as the chief regulator of telecommunications in the
United States, should retain the right to revoke licensing if U.S.
competition goals are not met.  However, in order to protect U.S.
negotiation tactics during the restructuring talks, the Administration
must be allowed to participate in the determination of competition
with the FCC.  Otherwise, multilateral negotiations by the
Administration may be jeopardized if other countries believe the FCC
is intent on denying it access to the U.S. markets.
Accordingly, section 601(a)(1) should be revised to read:
(1) COMPETITION TEST.—The Commission may not issue a
license or construction permit to any separated entity, or renew or
permit the assignment or use of any such license or permit, or
authorize the use by any entity subject to United States jurisdiction
of any space segment owned or operated by any separated entity,
unless both the Commission and the State Department determines
that such issuance, renewal, assignment, or use will not harm
competition in the telecommunications market of the United
States.  If the Commission or State Department does not make such
                                                       
tandem with other countries).
288. See supra note 227 (describing how James Cuminale of PanAmSat stated that the
attractiveness of the U.S. market can be used as a lever to induce other countries to adopt
market access reforms).
289. See discussion supra Part IV.C  (discussing the Administration’s opposition to the
unilateral legislative action).
a determination, it shall deny or revoke authority to use space
segment owned or operated by the separated entity to provide
services to, from, or within the United States.290
This approach will ensure that U.S. multilateral negotiating
positions are not forfeited, while also resting ultimate authority to
revoke licenses with the FCC.  As discussed earlier, the
Administration is involved with ongoing negotiations with
INTELSAT/Inmarsat parties to fully privatize these entities.  The
Administration’s cooperation is critical because the privatization of
the ISOs will require a global consensus.  As a result, relying solely on
unilateral FCC authority to revoke licenses may cause upheaval in the
negotiation processes.
The proposed provisions provide a joint incentive for both the FCC
and the State Department to cooperate in the restructuring talks.  By
acting together, the FCC and State Department can develop a
strategy to best meet the U.S. pro-competition goals.  For example,
the FCC and State Department can try a “good cop, bad cop”
approach to get signatories to give in to its terms.  While the State
Department plays the lead role in negotiating, the FCC can threaten
rejection if certain provisions are not met.  Finally, constitutional
concerns would be eliminated because both the Administration and
the FCC would share in the outcome of the talks.  Although the FCC
would relinquish some control in the matter, a shared and well
planned effort would be more suitable to U.S. interests abroad.
Alternatively, INTELSAT parties will be less reluctant to nullify the
Administration’s positions on the basis that they do not have
superseding authority over the FCC to revoke foreign operator’s
licenses.
CONCLUSION
While many countries subscribe to the futuristic views of Arthur
Clarke, there are others who remain apprehensive of Adam Smith’s
invisible hand.  The goal of any legislation should be directed at
                                                       
290. Presently, § 601(a)(1) states:
(1) COMPETITION TEST—The Commission may not issue a license or construction
permit to any separated entity, or renew or permit the assignment or use of any such
license or permit, or authorize the use by any entity subject to United States
jurisdiction of any space segment owned, leased, or operated by any separated entity,
unless the Commission determines that such issuance, renewal, assignment, or use will
not harm competition in the telecommunications market of the United States.  If the
Commission does not make such a determination, it shall deny or revoke authority to
use space segment owned, leased, or operated by the separated entity to provide
services to, from, or within the United States.
H.R. 1872, 105th Cong. § 601(a)(1) (1998).
striking a balance between both perspectives—ensuring technological
innovation to all countries while rewarding entrepreneurial spirit.
The Bliley, Burns, and Breaux Bills aimed to deliver in both regards.
Waving the United States’ lucrative telecommunications market in
the face of other countries, Capitol Hill is attempting to accelerate
liberalization policies already sweeping the entire world.
As more private operators begin matching the services previously
only available through the ISOs, the need for a regulated satellite
monopoly is marginalized.  Recent successes in the WTO Agreement
on Basic Telecommunications Services have evidenced the rest of the
world’s acknowledgment of this inevitable conclusion.  With more
and more foreign private operators clamoring for entry into the U.S.
telecommunications market, the draw of the U.S. market will be a
compelling reason for these operators to pressure their countries to
reform the ISOs in a competitive manner.  Accordingly, market
incentives should be retained as the cornerstone to any future
legislation in this area.
Besides economic incentives, incremental changes must also be
added to the revised Bliley Bill.  Crafting legislation that promotes
international diplomacy and fosters a cooperative effort between the
FCC and the Administration are important stepping stones when
developing a working model towards global success.  Accordingly,
providing flexibility in the Bliley Bill’s current timetables and
allowing a shared undertaking in the matter are fundamental to
restructuring the ISOs in a pro-competitive fashion.  Consequently,
these improvements will increase the likelihood of other countries
accepting Adam Smith’s invisible hand in lieu of Uncle Sam’s strong
arm.
